Regulation of hESC Research in Australia: Promises and Pitfalls for Deliberative Democratic Approaches by Dodds, Susan M & Ankeny, R. A.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Arts - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities 
July 2006 
Regulation of hESC Research in Australia: Promises and Pitfalls for 
Deliberative Democratic Approaches 
Susan M. Dodds 
University of Wollongong, sdodds@uow.edu.au 
R. A. Ankeny 
University of Sydney 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dodds, Susan M. and Ankeny, R. A., Regulation of hESC Research in Australia: Promises and Pitfalls for 
Deliberative Democratic Approaches 2006. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/105 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
1
Regulation of hESC Research in Australia: Promises and
Pitfalls for Deliberative Democratic Approaches
Susan Dodds1 and Rachel A. Ankeny2
1 Associate Professor in Philosophy
School of English Literatures
Philosophy and Languages
University of Wollongong
Wollongong, NSW 2522 Australia
email: sdodds@uow.edu.au
2 Senior Lecturer
Unit for History and Philosophy of Science
University of Sydney, NSW 2006 Australia
email: rankeny@science.usyd.edu.au
Word count (excluding abstract and references): 7517
2
Author declaration
This article is based on independent work supported by an Australian Research Council
Discovery Grant Big Picture Bioethics: Policy-Making and Liberal Democracy.
No ethical approval was required or sought for this research.
3
Abstract  (word count: 178)
This paper considers the legislative debates in Australia that led to the passage of the
Research Involving Human Embryos Act (Cth 2002) and the Prohibition of Human
Cloning Act (Cth 2002). In the first part of the paper, we discuss the debate surrounding
the legislation with particular emphasis on the ways in which demands for public
consultation, public debate and the education of Australians about the potential ethical
and scientific impact of human embryonic stem cells (hESC) research were deployed,
and the explicit and implicit framing of the scope of public consultation. We then ask
whether, given the calls for public consultations, debate and understanding, current work
in democratic theory could be helpful in analyzing the process of policy-making in these
areas. In particular, we canvass the literature relating to aggregative and deliberative
models of democracy for processes that support the legitimacy of policy. We identify
features of the debate that reflect the appeal of deliberative approaches as well as some of
the possible hurdles or limitations to developing deliberative democratic approaches to
policy in ethically contentious areas.
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This article offers a brief historical review of the processes that led to the
enactment of Australian Commonwealth (federal) legislation on human embryo
experimentation and cloning.(see also 1, 2) In light of those aspects of the policy-making
process that appealed to public consultation, identification of community standards, and
the need for the legislation to be in keeping with the views of the Australian public, we
consider the challenges of developing public policy in these ethically contentious areas
by drawing on current theoretical work on deliberative democracy.
Prior to 2002, research on human embryos was not regulated directly by federal
law. The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) had developed a
series of guidelines that were regularly reviewed and revised concerning embryo
research, and several Australian states had legislation regulating both embryo research
and assisted reproductive technology (ART). State-based legislation varied considerably,
ranging from no legal regulation (relying entirely on the NHMRC guidelines and the
judgment of individual research ethics committees in some states such as New South
Wales), to quite comprehensive legislation (for instance in Victoria, which arguably as a
result was the fastest to be outstripped by technological developments).
In 2000, Alan Trounson, a pioneer in IVF research at the Monash Institute for
Reproduction and Development Centre in Melbourne, Victoria, announced successful
experiments to develop stem cell lines using human embryonic stem cells (hESC) derived
from embryos sourced in Singapore, making his research group among the first in the
world to successfully grow hESC. Announcements of successful development of stem
cell lines from various research centers around the world and rumors of efforts to engage
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in human cloning led to widespread concern to ensure greater regulatory control over
activities that were said to be ‘unacceptable’ to Australians and their community
standards.(see e.g. 3: §11.50-11.56)
At the same time, the state and Commonwealth governments, building on the
early research successes in Australia, actively sought investment from the biotechnology
industry. The Commonwealth government funded a National Centre for Advanced Cell
Engineering in 2002, which was later renamed the Australian Stem Cell Centre, to bring
together research teams from the Monash Institute of Reproduction and Development,
Monash University, and Adelaide University, as well as the biotechnology companies
BresaGen and ES Cell International. In the legislative realm, a series of Senate hearings
and an inquiry into human cloning and stem cell research occurred in 2001-2 and
eventually resulted in the Research Involving Embryos Act (Cth 2002) and the
Prohibition of Human Cloning Act (Cth 2002). More recently, a legislative review of the
Australian Research Involving Embryos Act (Cth 2002) and the Prohibition of Human
Cloning Act (Cth 2002) has commenced, which is likely to have implications for hESC
research.(4)
As most of the publicly accessible debate has occurred in the Australian federal
parliament, we focus on legislative processes, including submissions made in the context
of various parliamentary reviews, and on popular media coverage of legislative
processes. We argue that, at least symbolically, the calls in those processes for ongoing
public dialogue, for public education and consultation, and for open discussion about the
value of the science and the ethical issues involved in embryo and cloning research
express concerns that policy-making in this ethically contentious area should be
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responsive to the attitudes of Australians and should reflect a process of deliberation
rather than unreflective preference expression. In fact, as we demonstrate below, there is
little evidence that those involved in the legislative process genuinely sought broader
public involvement and engagement with the issues raised by the science or the
legislation. However, we believe that it is worth asking whether and how developments
in democratic theory can usefully guide policy-development processes concerning issues
like hESC research and human cloning. We examine the possible application of
deliberative models of democracy to policy development in areas such as hESC research
and therapeutic cloning and identify some of the possible limitations to such approaches
and hurdles they may face.
Part I: The Legislative History
Australia is composed of six states—New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South
Australia, Western Australia, and Tasmania—that are self-governing within the
constitutional limits of the federal structure, and two territories—the Northern Territory
and the Australian Capital Territory—that have self-governing, regional governments,
but that do not have the constitutional status of statehood. The Commonwealth (federal)
government has a limited range of legislative responsibilities, which includes power to
legislate regarding corporations, commerce, trade, and interstate trade. Both state and
federal legislatures can make law regarding criminal offences. The Commonwealth
provides the bulk of funding for universities, resources for health care, and public
funding for research. The states have direct responsibility for many areas of law and
policy, including health law, provision of health services (hospitals), and education.
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Legislation associated with assisted reproductive technology (ART) and embryo
experimentation is, constitutionally, a matter for state governance. In proposing the
legislation concerning embryo research and cloning, the Commonwealth government
chose to make use of its corporations power within the Constitution (Section 51 (xx)) to
impose consistent law across the country that would provide a framework for future state
legislation and override current state legislation that was inconsistent with the
Commonwealth law.
Some of the earliest proposed federal legislation related to hESC and embryo
research was the Commonwealth Human Embryo Experimentation Bill, introduced in
1985 by Senator Brian Harradine. This bill caused the formation of a Senate Select
Committee chaired by Senator Michael Tate.(5) The resulting Tate Report concluded that
the bill not be further considered, and instead recommended regulation at the
Commonwealth level with cooperation from the states and territories, as well as
establishment of a national body to issue research protocols and licenses for embryo
experimentation; the bill was never passed by Parliament, and the guidelines
recommended Commonwealth regulatory mechanisms of the Tate Committee were never
pursued.
Some of the first Australian legislation relating to stem cell research had its roots
in earlier state legislation in Victoria (1984, 1995), South Australia (1988), and Western
Australia (1991), all of which banned destructive research on embryos. This legislation
also provided guidelines for storage of embryos for ART and their destruction after a set
period (which differed from state to state), as well as a ban on human cloning (although
cloning was defined differently in each state). The original Victorian legislation had a
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strict regulatory system that included criminal penalties, which was replaced in the later
act by a licensure system for ART clinics and providers. Research that destroys or
diminishes the potential for an embryo to be re-implanted was prohibited, which
effectively prohibited hESC research. Both the South Australian and Western Australian
legislation also included licensure systems and codes of practice for ART providers, but
were slightly more permissive with regard to the research activities allowed.
In most other states, committees were convened to examine ART practices. In
addition, in New South Wales, the Law Reform Commission issued a set of detailed
reports, none of which resulted in legislation.(1) Some states, such as New South Wales,
also had additional, specific guidelines requiring ethics committee oversight. In the states
and territories without legislation, researchers were primarily bound by the NHMRC’s
Ethical Guidelines on Assisted Reproductive Technology (1996) (6) and the National
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (1999),(7) which provided
a form of quasi-regulation.(see 8)
The NHMRC is the national body in Australia charged with publicly funding
health and medical research and provision of advice and guidelines in health and
medicine for public clinical and research settings. As such, it is the main source of formal
ethical guidelines for publicly-funded health and medical research, a function
administrated through the Australian Health Ethics Committee (AHEC); health advice
and clinical guidelines are provided through the Health Advisory Committee. On the
issue of embryos, the NHMRC Guidelines in effect prior to 2002 focused on ART
services (these providers often also conduct research), and only in this context did the
Guidelines address issues of embryo experimentation and (implicitly) human cloning;
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under the Guidelines, sanctions for infringement are not legal but relate to loss of
research funding or more informal penalty mechanisms. The Guidelines claimed that
there are widely divergent views among Australians with regard to the moral status of the
embryo, and hence embryo research, and clearly limited work with human embryos to
‘therapeutic procedures which leave the embryo, or embryos, with an expectation of
implantation and development’.(6: 10) Even this type of therapeutic research required
approval by a human research ethics committee.(cf.9)
The Guidelines also prohibited the production of embryos for purposes other than
use in ART, as well as experimentation aimed at the ‘development of human embryonal
stem cell lines with the aim of producing a clone of individuals’.(6: 15) Finally, the
Fertility Society of Australia administers an accreditation committee for ART clinics,
which requires compliance with a code of practice that also makes the NHMRC
guidelines binding for private clinics; this puts in place a form of self-regulation, though
some critics have argued that the system is not adequately independent and that formal
legislation would be preferable.(8)
Following news about the cloning of Dolly the sheep, the Commonwealth
government, through the Minister of Health and Aged Care, requested more detailed
advice on cloning from AHEC, including recommendations for a regulatory model that
could articulate with international regulations and guidelines. In response, AHEC
specifically recommended that all states and territories introduce legislation to regulate
and limit research on human embryos based on the NHMRC Guidelines. In addition,
AHEC explicitly recommended that ‘informed community discussion’ on the potential
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risks and benefits of cloning techniques should be fostered by the Health Minister.(10:
43)
In August of 1999, following continuing popular media coverage of further
developments in cloning and hESC research, the Commonwealth Health Minister Dr
Michael Wooldridge requested a review of the AHEC report by the Federal Parliament’s
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. Two
years later, the Andrews Report (named after committee chair Mr Kevin Andrews, MP)
was released. In preparing this report, the Committee not only reviewed the existing
AHEC Report, but also initiated a public consultation process. The Committee invited
submissions from the general public through a website established for the Committee as
well as publicity in major newspaper outlets; it also solicited submissions from various
governmental agencies, religious representatives, medical and scientific organizations,
community representatives likely to have interests in the topic including disease support
groups, legal scholars, and bioethicists. The Committee held two public fora early in
2000, at which various spokespersons from religious, bioethical and scientific
perspectives were asked to make presentations; attendees could ask questions or make
statements following these presentations.(3)
The Andrews Report recommended the establishment of federal legislation for the
regulation of both publicly- and privately-funded research on human cloning and stem
cells, writing that ‘the questions raised by human cloning and research involving the use
of embryos are complex social and ethical questions and should not be left to individual
ethics committees to decide. Nor should the answer to such fundamental questions
depend on geography or source of funding’.(3: xxvi) Commonwealth legislation in this
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area would override existing piecemeal state legislation and also be separate from
regulations governing ART. The Report proposed a three-year moratorium on the use of
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) for creation of human embryos and on human
reproductive cloning. It proposed that any supernumerary (‘surplus’) embryos from ART
clinics could be used for research that damaged or destroyed the embryos, so long as
these projects had the consent of the couple whose tissues were used in the creation of the
embryos, had been approved by ethics committees, and had been issued a ‘license’; these
rules would apply equally to private and public researchers working in Australia.
While the Andrews Committee’s deliberations were ongoing, the Council of
Australian Governments (COAG)—an organization that fosters discussion between state,
territory, and Commonwealth heads of government in an effort to promote consistent
legislation—was also debating the regulation of cloning and related technologies. In mid-
2000, the Australian health ministers agreed to develop ‘a national framework to prevent
the exploitation of human cloning’, and in 2001, COAG began to negotiate nationally
consistent legislation to prohibit human cloning.(11) At a meeting in April of 2002, the
members of COAG agreed to ban human cloning and to foster a regulation scheme to
govern research involving the destruction of existing excess ART embryos that would be
nationally consistent. This latter decision was part of a trade-off designed to balance
community concerns with the desire ‘to enable Australia to remain at the forefront of
research which may lead to medical breakthroughs in the treatment of disease’.(12) The
premiers of New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland—the states with the largest
research presence in this field—had threatened to allow stem cell research even if the
Commonwealth Government sought to ban it. As a compromise, it was agreed that only
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embryos created prior to the COAG meeting held on April 5, 2002, could be used for
research. This restriction, set to expire in three years, was introduced to prevent the
deliberate creation of embryos intended only for research purposes during that
moratorium. The states also agreed to develop state legislation to complement the federal
legislation. To date this legislative process has not yet been completed and some of the
states with ART legislation have not amended their legislation to make it consistent with
the Commonwealth Acts, which, by constitutional authority, override the State Acts
where there are inconsistencies.
In June 2002, when the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth
Parliament began to consider the Research Involving Embryos and Prohibition of Human
Cloning Bill, a considerable amount of debate had already occurred and the COAG
guidelines were already in place. The proposed bill prohibited human cloning, as had
already been agreed to by the states via COAG, and only allowed experimentation on
supernumerary embryos with oversight, again in line with the COAG decisions.
Prime Minister John Howard quickly announced that a ‘conscience vote’ would
be allowed on the bill, an extremely unusual provision that allows voting across party
lines and in line with ministers’ personal values and moral beliefs. For some this practice
is considered to run contrary to representative democracy. Others, however, argue that
this is no less consistent with representative democracy than voting along party lines
when the matters being voted on are not related to policies aired during the election
process. The phrasing of the original bill did not allow a vote in opposition to both
cloning and all forms of embryo experimentation, as it explicitly allowed some forms of
embryo experimentation. For this reason, the bill was split by the House of
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Representatives in late August of 2002 into the Prohibition of Human Cloning Bill and
the Research Involving Human Embryos Bill. Both bills were passed by the House of
Representatives. When the two bills were sent to the Senate, the Senate Community
Affairs Legislation Committee (chaired by Senator Sue Knowles) established a Selection
of Bills Committee of Inquiry that reviewed both bills and delivered a report suggesting
considerable disagreement: from a six-member committee came a report containing five
distinct positions.(13) Nonetheless, the Senate unanimously passed the Prohibition of
Human Cloning Bill in mid-November and the Research Involving Human Embryos Bill
was passed by a slim Senate majority in early December. Both bills received Royal
Assent and became law in mid-December 2002.
Of particular interest are the licensing provisions in the second Act, administered
via the NHMRC by a committee convened to oversee a licensing system allowing use of
‘excess’ ART embryos up to 14 days of development for research in accordance with the
Act. The committee consists of members from a variety of scientific and medical fields,
including ART research/practice and stem cell research, as well as regulation, law,
bioethics, and consumer perspectives. When granting licenses, the committee is charged
to consider the number of excess embryos to be used, the likelihood of significant
advances in knowledge or therapies from the research, and alternatives to destructive
research, including combining research projects to reduce the overall number of embryos
destroyed. The committee is publicly accountable and also has to make periodic reports
on its licensing activities. As of April, 2006, nine license applications had been granted
by the committee, authorizing the use of ‘up to 1740 excess embryos’.(4: 19)
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Democracy and Public Consultation
In arguments concerning ethically contentious areas of policy development, particularly
in cases where scientific knowledge, theories, and techniques are rapidly changing, it is
typically assumed that policy-makers should assess and track public attitudes toward the
relevant scientific developments. This is due, in part, to the state’s role as the ‘guardian of
the public interest’, (14: xxxii) and also to the idea within liberal theory that the
legitimacy of public policies depends, in principle, on the ability of the policy-maker to
justify those policies to any reasonable member of the society.(15: 44) In the case of the
development of the Australian human embryo experimentation and cloning legislation,
these assumptions are evident in a number of the Parliamentary reports, including the
Andrews Report, various contributions to the Knowles Report, the AHEC submission,
and statements by state and federal representatives following the passage of the Act. For
instance, the Andrews Report clearly states its concern about the necessity of public
consultation in the development of policy concerning human cloning and embryo
research:
These are not matters to be decided behind closed doors by scientists or
lawyers, however expert and sincere, without widespread community
consultation. Nor are they matters that can be resolved by doing nothing. As
a society we are confronted with profound issues that require ongoing
attention and discussion.(3: xiii)
The Report also appears to hold the view that debate about the significance of scientific
advances should be encouraged within the scientific community and should inform
regulation: ‘So that regulation in this area is appropriate to these benefits and risks [of
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developments in treatment of human diseases], the debate and consultation over the
issues arising from the scientific advances in science should be as informed as
possible’.(3: 3)
In its conclusions, the Andrews Report indicates that AHEC should be charged
with responsibility for ‘developing and implementing a strategy to consult and involve
the public in consideration of the issues arising from this research and encourage debate
on the potential and implications of the research’.1(3: 228). Similarly, in submissions to
the Andrews Report and in the subsequent debate that led to the passage of the federal
legislation, various politicians, ethicists, and legal commentators claimed that there was
need for continuing public debate on the social and ethical consequences of hESC
research and the potential for therapeutic cloning.(13)
For example, Senators Stott Despoja, Lucas and Webber argued for ‘better
mechanisms to educate and involve the public in bioethical issues. We need to ensure that
the public has access to information, that they are educated about the issues in language
they understand, and that they feel able to make their voices heard on the issues’.(13:
170) They recommended a process similar to the U.S. Presidential Commission on
Bioethics, which they viewed as constructed to articulate and present ‘a variety of views
rather than reaching a single consensus opinion. Such a process, properly constituted,
could help facilitate a greater understanding of bioethical issues here in Australia’.(13:
170-1) Senators Barnett, Heffernan, Hutchins, and others, citing the submission by the
GenEthics Network (16) objecting to NHMRC review, were not convinced that a
subcommittee of the NHMRC was the most appropriate body to review the legislation,
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because it would not provide for proper representation of public concerns about the
legislation. They argued:
…review by a joint house parliamentary committee, comprising
representative numbers of each party [would be] more appropriate. There
are serious ethical issues that this review needs to take into account, and
not only are members of parliament appropriate representatives of
community concerns, but furthermore, it is appropriate that legislators
have a role in the review of contentious legislation such as this.(13: 134-5)
Demands for Public Debate and the Implicit Framing of Debates
Despite these various statements apparently seeking to open up public
discussion about the issues raised by hESC and cloning, there are many reasons to
question whether all of those who made such calls genuinely sought open public
debate about the legislation. One notable feature of such calls in relation to hESC
research was their emphasis on issues around the scientific, social, and ethical
potential of the research, where this was understood as largely separable from the
economic and financial potential of the research. Although politicians from
various perspectives raised questions about the economic impact of hESC
research and cloning, the constitutionality of federal regulation, states’ interests in
attracting the biotechnology industry into their areas, and the risk that ‘cutting
edge’ scientists currently employed by Australian research institutions might
leave the country to pursue their research elsewhere, these were not among the
issues suggested for inclusion in the public debate. The mandate for the public
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debate was tightly circumscribed, focusing on a narrow range of ethical issues,
without any clear argument to support such a limited focus (see 3, 12, 13).
Further, despite strong calls for public education, consultation, and debate
about embryo research, and the press coverage of the debate, there has not yet
been any further inquiry into hESC research since the passage of the legislation.
This is particularly surprising given a number of factors. First, the COAG
agreement to impose a moratorium on making surplus IVF embryos available for
research for three years from April 5, 2002 created a space and a deadline for
public debate about the use of such embryos for research, and yet no state or
federal body initiated a public consultation process before the moratorium was
lifted on April 5, 2005. Second, the legislation that was passed contained an
unusually brief time period before it would be reviewed: a review committee was
to be established by the NHMRC and report by the end of 2005.2 Again, it might
have been thought that this short review time was intended to ensure that
Australians would have the opportunity to reflect on and respond to the legislation
and developing science before the implications of the legislation became
entrenched over time, so as to ensure that the legislation tracked the changing
attitudes to the evolving scientific situation. However, no formal consultative
process has been established or proposed in the period since the enactment of the
legislation. In its Issues Paper, the Legislative Review Committee (LRC) states
It is not the purpose of reviews to revisit the underpinning community
debate and rationale for the two Acts. Rather the purpose is to review the
Acts in the light of any changes in scientific or community standards since
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2002, and any indications that the provisions are no longer appropriate
and/or practical in their application.(4: 3)
Given the timeframe and structure of the review, it was unlikely that the LRC
could truly engage with community standards or values: no open public fora
occurred as part of the review, with sessions primarily being facilitated
discussions by invitation or expert testimony. The main means for ‘members of
the public’ to express their views was through written submissions; although a
relatively high number of submissions were received, many were standard text
seemingly provided by various religious organisations.
Part II: Aggregative and Deliberative Models of Democracy
The processes leading to the passage of the Prohibition of Human Cloning and Research
Involving Human Embryos Acts in 2002 do not offer a model of participatory democratic
public policy development, despite the many references to a need for public consultation,
engagement, and deliberation. There are probably many reasons for this beyond those
identified above, including lack of public interest in the issues, economic interests, and
party political issues. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to investigate the potential and the
pitfalls of democratic approaches to legitimate policy-making in ethically contentious
areas against the backdrop of these recent processes.
Within democratic theory, there are competing ideals of democratic legitimacy:
some emphasize that democracy seeks to treat the interests and values of citizens equally,
and some emphasize that democracy seeks a politics in which citizens participate in
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reasoning about what policies or institutions ought to be adopted (17, 18). These two
ideals correspond to aggregative and deliberative models of democracy.
The demand for democratic equality (evidenced in plebiscites or referenda) and
representative democracy (where elected representatives mirror the values of the majority
who elected them) does not require that the interests implicit in the policies selected
through the democratic process reflect the enlightened or considered judgment of the
people or demos. Rather, legitimacy comes from the fact that policies reflect the
preferences expressed by the majority, however constituted. As Jane Mansbridge
describes the process:
Voters pursue their individual interest by making demands on the political
system in proportion to the intensity of their feelings. Politicians, also
pursuing their own interests, adopt policies that buy them votes, thus
ensuring accountability. In order to stay in office, politicians act like
entrepreneurs and brokers, looking for formulas that satisfy as many, and
alienate as few, interests as possible. From the interchange between self-
interested voters and self-interested brokers emerge decisions that come as
close as possible to a balanced aggregation of individual interests.(19: 17)
Iris Marion Young describes the approach where voters’ interests are uncritically
collected in policy formation as an ‘aggregative model’ of democracy.(20) On this model,
legitimacy comes from the reflection or mirroring of interests through accountable
legislative processes. The accountability of elected representatives to their constituents
through regular elections forces legislators to attend to the interests and preferences of the
electorate. The more closely legislators reflect the values of the majority of their
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constituents, the greater the legitimacy of the policies enacted. Politics is not intended to
reshape interests, but instead to broker arrangements such that the different arrays of
preferences of the majority are reflected in policy.
This emphasis on democratic equality or the aggregative model has been
criticized on the following fronts: that it allows those with greater wealth or power to
influence unduly how the competing interests are reflected in policy; that voting is a poor
process for ranking priorities; that it provides insufficient protection against ‘the tyranny
of the majority’; that it silences minority interests; that it cannot address issues of
uncertainty; and that it frames politics as adversarial, rather than as a normative practice
of reciprocal obligation of justification.(19, 21-26) Many critics of aggregative models
advocate a ‘deliberative turn’ towards a politics in which legitimacy is found in critical
reasoning processes of deliberation and preference-formation by citizens reflecting on
policies and institutions, rather than merely voting on them. Jürgen Habermas describes
this model as a return to the ‘original meaning of democracy as in terms of the
institutionalization of a public use of reason jointly exercised by autonomous
citizens’.(27: 23)
A deliberative approach to democracy emphasizes the legitimation of policy that
comes from the transformation of interests through processes of
…collective decision making by all those who will be affected by the
decision or their representatives: this is the democratic part. Also…it
includes decision making by means of arguments offered by and to
participants who are committed to the values of rationality and
impartiality: this is the deliberative part.(28: 8)
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For Habermas, it is the ‘procedures and communicative presuppositions of democratic
opinion- and will-formation’ that ground rationalization and justification of political
decision. However, such exercises of public democratic processes should not be seen as
directly determining policy; they can only ‘point the use of administrative power in
specific directions’.(27: 28-9, see also Dodds S, Thomson C. Bioethics and democracy:
the competing roles of national bioethics organizations. Bioethics. Forthcoming 2006.)
Recent work extends deliberative approaches by incorporating critical assessment of
established power structures that may shape and limit deliberation and recognizing the
significance of the historical absence or exclusion of oppressed groups from public
reasoning fora.(20, 25)
In the demand for public, scientific, and expert debate about the ethical issues
surrounding hESC research in Australia, there is evidence of appeals both to aggregative
legitimacy and to discursive deliberation (even if many of these calls were more symbolic
than real). The call by Senator Heffernan and his colleagues for a parliamentary
committee to review the legislation, as ‘members of parliament [are] appropriate
representatives of community concerns’,(13: 135) can be understood as based on the
aggregative appeal to political legitimacy in the negotiation of citizens’ actual
preferences, rather than their transformation through deliberation. In contrast, the calls for
a forum for public debate on the issues raised by embryo research, human cloning, and
the proposed legislation, and particularly the claim by Senator Stott Despoja and her
colleagues that there is a need for ‘better mechanisms to educate and involve the public in
bioethical issues’,(13: 170) echo the advocates of deliberative democracy in their
suggestion that legitimacy is grounded in processes of public reasoning. Given the
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limitations of aggregative models detailed above, we turn to examining the possibilities
and limitations of deliberative models of democracy for democratically legitimate policy-
making processes.
The Challenge of Deliberation
Is a deliberative approach to democratic legitimacy an appropriate ideal for democratic
decision-making in ethically-contentious areas such as hESC research, embryo
experimentation more generally, or therapeutic cloning? In this section, we identify some
of the hurdles that a deliberative approach would have to surmount, and some of the
‘pathologies of deliberation’ that could beset debate concerning embryo research. We
consider various preconditions for effective deliberation and offer two examples of
policy-making processes in similar areas that have been used in Australia and Canada and
that appear to fulfill these basic preconditions to a greater or lesser extent. We argue that
these examples could be followed in public deliberation regarding hESC regulation.
The first hurdle to processes of deliberative democracy is the willingness of
deliberators to change their mind as the result of deliberation and the attitude of
deliberators towards each other’s opinions. As John Dryzek writes:
One defining feature of deliberative democracy is that individuals
participating in democratic processes are amenable to changing their
minds and their preferences as a result of the reflection induced by
deliberation.(25: 31)
The requirement that individuals be prepared to ‘play the game’ of deliberation—to
participate in the exercise of public reasoning with an open mind to the views of other
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deliberators—goes to the heart of the democratic appeal of deliberative approaches.
Citizens participating in processes of deliberation can be thought of as motivated by
concern for ‘the common good’ or at least minimal respect for the distinct views of their
fellow citizens. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that deliberative approaches
appeal to a notion of justice, namely that of reciprocity, and that reciprocity entails a level
of respect for fellow citizens and hence recognition of a need to justify one’s views to
them:
Reciprocity holds that citizens owe one another justifications for mutually
binding laws and public policies that they collectively enact. The aim of a
theory that takes reciprocity seriously is to help people to seek political
agreement on the basis of principles that can be justified to others who
share the aim of reaching such an agreement.(18: 33)
If we consider this point in relation to the case of research involving human
embryos and human cloning in Australia, there may well have been widespread
agreement that there was a need for a clear policy. The chief impetus for national
legislation was the uncertainty and inconsistency associated with the existing system of
distinct legislation in three states and self-regulation in the other jurisdictions.(3: 211-2)
However, it is less clear that the potential participants in deliberation about the
appropriate mode of regulation in this area were open to changing their minds in light of
deliberative processes. While many participants in the debate shared an ‘overlapping
consensus’(29) on the ethical, social, and economic issues associated with hESC
research, there were also participants who held highly polarized views about the moral
status of embryos, the value of scientific progress, the potential for commerce in
24
biotechnology, and the potential for research in this area to realize health equity. Unless
there is a shared commitment to the process of policy deliberations, the ethical divide
between those who value human embryos as having the same or very similar moral status
to adult humans, and those who view such ‘surplus’ embryos as valuable resources for
research and the development of novel pharmaceutical products, leaves little room for
reflective preference transformation.
F. N. Gambetta writes about the challenge of deliberation in cultures that value
‘winning arguments’ over the presentation of arguments in order to elucidate positions
and persuade others.(30) He argues that in countries where a culture predominates by
dismissing rather than engaging with one’s opponent, there will be a need for institutions
to protect deliberative processes by limiting adversarial approaches and encouraging
tentative deliberations that acknowledge the partiality of deliberators’ knowledge and
authority. Gambetta argues, however, that it is easier to develop these institutions in the
case of deliberation about beliefs, rather than about values, including the value of
adversarial debate. If Gambetta is right, then reciprocal respect for significantly differing
knowledge claims (e.g., concerning the science of hESC) is more readily developed than
reciprocal respect for widely differing values (e.g., concerning the ethical status of
supernumerary ART embryos). This conclusion suggests that debate among those with
fundamentally opposed value systems is not certain to yield deliberative outcomes that
meet the Habermasian standard for legitimacy, because the parties do not wish to respect
a duty of reciprocal regard for the values of those with whom they are deliberating.
Cass Sunstein reinforces Dryzek’s argument and gives further reasons to be
skeptical about the potential for deliberation on contentious issues in contexts where
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members of deliberating groups share values related to an identity. He describes the ‘law
of group polarization’ as follows:
Group polarization means that members of a deliberating group predictably move
toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’
predeliberation tendencies….Notably, groups consisting of individuals with
extremist tendencies are more likely to shift, and likely to shift more…; the same
is true for groups with some kind of salient shared identity.(31: 81)
The effect of group polarization is that groups make more extreme decisions than the
average individual member of the group would make on her own.(31: 82) Polarization
occurs most frequently when groups with some shared values (e.g., political parties or
interest groups) consider policies without outside influence, or without having to reflect
on or seriously respond to alternative arguments. Within such groups, there is a high
degree of consensus and shared opposition to views held by other groups. The law of
group polarization suggests in the absence of deliberators with diverse views and
identifications, the deliberation will tend towards an extreme position. Sunstein argues
that effective deliberation requires a degree of disagreement: in other words, the
deliberative group’s openness to alternative views is a requirement for legitimate
deliberation and the process of deliberation about public policy needs to be open, rather
than occurring in separate, polarizing enclaves. If deliberation about a policy affecting a
diversity of people occurs by a process where deliberators are divided into separate
groups the members of which are relatively homogenous, then, on Sunstein’s view, the
outcome of those separate deliberations will be increased polarization between the
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deliberative groups rather than the emergence of views that can claim democratic
legitimacy.
A further challenge to deliberation in areas of rapid scientific development is that
the citizenry who might participate in deliberative discussion often lack (or feel that they
lack) the knowledge and information required to evaluate the science or policies under
consideration. Alan Irwin notes the need for development of a public understanding of
science, and hence for experts to engage in open debate about the value and risks of
relevant scientific developments so that citizen-deliberators are in a position to weigh the
merits of the scientific arguments for themselves.(32) As Dryzek puts it, an effective
citizen voice in economic and technological developments requires a citizenry that is
appropriately circumspect in its response to the authority of experts:
…distrust of experts does not mean that everyone has to become an expert.
Instead, it can mean approaching expert testimony with a sceptical attitude,
perhaps questioning the credentials of experts, seeking corroboration for any
contentious claim, refusing to believe an expert if his or her research is funded by
the offending industry, or if his or her record indicates an axe to grind.(25: 165)
It is unlikely that ‘experts’ in the debates surrounding hESC research in Australia will be
considered free from potential bias: the scientists who have the greatest experience of the
research are often those, like Trounson, who have been at the forefront of the research
and who have the most to gain in terms of research and financial opportunities. The
ethical and religious ‘experts’ who have pronounced on the issues (e.g., in submissions to
the Andrews inquiry and the recent LRC) often express views based in their religious or
ideological commitments. Therefore, in order to have effective deliberation, the citizens
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who will be affected by the regulations must develop critical skills in evaluating the
claims made by experts on all sides. The primary avenue for most citizens to gain
information about these developments is the mass media; however such sources primarily
provide ‘sound-bite’ news reports or current affairs programs that seek to reduce complex
issues to simplistic adversarial positions.(30: 40) The hESC debate in Australia has been
framed in the media as a ‘science versus religion’ debate that oversimplifies and polarizes
the range of plausible positions. Policy-makers who seek to be informed by public
deliberative processes will need to identify means for developing public fora within
which truly effective deliberation may occur.
Conclusion—Deliberative Optimism
Our conclusion to this overview of some of the challenges for deliberative
democracy is not, ultimately, as pessimistic as it might first seem. We note the significant
limitations of aggregative approaches and the political and economic influences that raise
questions about the legitimacy of bargain-based preference expression as a means of
legitimating policy. We also recognize the challenges facing those who would seek to
develop models for open deliberative discussion of policy that could then inform
legislators. However, we do not believe that the challenges are insurmountable or should
be avoided. Indeed, within Australia there is a precedent for more deliberative policy
formulation in relevantly similar areas to hESC research and human cloning, namely the
process that framed the report of the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and
AHEC on genetic privacy entitled Essentially Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic
Information in Australia.(33) While the process may not be without criticism, it suggests
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a way forward for developing practical approaches to consultation that are directed
towards the ideal of legitimacy grounded in processes of public reasoning.(34, 35)
Unlike the Andrews report, which was based firmly within the political legislative
process, the ALRC and AHEC joint inquiry was an independent report to the Attorney
General. The terms of reference for the report specifically charged the ALRC and AHEC
with determining whether regulation was required (and, if so, in what form), in order to
protect privacy of human genetic samples and genetic information, to protect against
discriminatory use of genetic samples and information, and ‘to reflect the balance of
ethical considerations relevant to the collection and uses of human genetic samples and
information in Australia’.(33: 13)
In carrying out its work, the ALRC and AHEC were to ‘identify and consult with
relevant stakeholders, including the Privacy Commissioner and the Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission, and ensure widespread public consultation’.(33: 13-14)
Regulation of human genetic privacy, in our view, is no less technically complex than
regulation of hESC research. Given the potential developments in genomics and social
policy surrounding genetics, genetic privacy matters may become as socially divisive as
hESC research. Even if debates surrounding human embryo research prove to be more
divisive than those about genetic privacy, that is not a reason for avoiding deliberation,
given the significance of the process of public reasoning for the legitimacy of the
resultant policy. The process that the ALRC and AHEC joint inquiry followed in meeting
its aims fulfilled many of the preconditions discussed above and followed closely an
iterative deliberative process for bioethical policy-making.(as recommended in Dodds S,
Thomson C. Bioethics and democracy: the competing roles of national bioethics
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organizations. Bioethics. Forthcoming 2006.) The Inquiry started its process of public
consultation with the release of an Issues Paper, setting out the key issues relevant to
development of policy in the area of genetic privacy, from the perspective of legal,
ethical, and scientific experts (members of an expert Advisory committee established as
part of the Inquiry, and with reference to the position of various relevant international
bodies such as UNESCO and HUGO). The Issues Paper was circulated widely in hard
and soft copy as the first step in the public consultation process. Nearly a year later, the
matters raised in that Issues Paper together with the response to that paper by key
stakeholders (and other expert input) were refined into a Discussion Paper that was again
widely circulated in hard copy and on the internet to promote public education and debate
on the issue of genetic privacy. The ALRC and AHEC joint inquiry process reflected its
key aim ‘to find a sensible path that meets twin goals: to foster innovations in genetic
research and practice that serve humanitarian ends, and to provide sufficient reassurance
to the community that such innovations will be subject to proper ethical scrutiny and
legal (and other) controls’.(33: 33-34)
The direct community consultation process involved a number of face-to-face
meetings and public submissions. There were also 15 open public fora in capital cities
and regional centers, at which members of the Inquiry’s Working Group presented
information about the issues and process of the Inquiry; questions and comments from
the people who attended also were recorded, opening up debate among members of the
public and experts. Over 200 meetings were held between the ALRC and AHEC team
and key stakeholders, including meetings with international bodies. Over 300 written
submissions were received, most of which were made available publicly through the
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Inquiry’s website. The Inquiry made 144 recommendations to state and federal
legislators.(33: 97-102)
Those recommendations reflect a debate that, while focused through the terms of
reference set by the Attorney General, was not narrowly restricted to discussion of
Australians’ ethical attitudes to specific features of the issues at stake. The submissions
received and contributions made to the public meetings can be viewed as more genuinely
reflecting a process of deliberation within which the participants were seeking to
understand, explain, and persuade others with regard to matters relevant to policy
development, rather than ‘scoring points’ in a political bargain for a specific legislative
outcome.
While it is possible for these intensive iterative consultation processes to be
subverted by well-organized groups reflecting one perspective held in the community, it
is certainly the case that any legislation that is developed as a result of this type of
process and based on the recommendations of the Inquiry can make a claim to legitimacy
based on public deliberation in a way that legislation that has not had the benefit of such
a process cannot.
Would the outcome of the legislation concerning human embryo research and
cloning in Australia have been different if the process had been more deliberative? We
suggest that the answer to this question is yes, because there would have been greater
opportunity to assess the views of Australians, and for those views to shape the
legislative debate. The outcome may not have been substantively different, however,
even if the political influence on the process of deliberation had been minimal. For the
deliberative approach, the outcome is not the point; the key is the legitimacy conferred by
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the process on the outcome. If there is a shared public commitment to deliberative
preference formation, and if the cultural conditions are set for non-polarizing deliberation
and for skeptical reflection on expert contributions, then the Andrews Report, the
Research Involving Embryos Act (2002), and the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act
(2002) could be starting points for future public debate about the social, ethical, and
economic values at stake in the development of hESC research. They cannot be viewed,
given their history of closed parliamentary inquiries and public consultation limited in
both scope and volume, as evidence of a process of deliberative policy development. That
deliberation, and the legitimacy that would be afforded to policy informed by it, has yet
to be seen in Australia on the issue of hESC research, but it could be developed using
methods similar to the ALRC and AHEC Inquiry process. An opportunity to do so could
arise when Parliament receives the report of the LRC and again when the NHMRC
Guidelines relating to human embryo research and human cloning are next reviewed. It
will be interesting to witness the further processes that result from the recommendations
of the LRC, but there is little reason to be optimistic that the immediate legislative
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1 It is interesting, in light of this view, that Recommendation 9, which immediately follows this
explanation, makes a less explicit claim with regard to public consultation: ‘The Committee recommends
that the Australian Health Ethics Committee (AHEC) be responsible for monitoring scientific
developments in this area, analysing their potential impact and providing advice to Commonwealth, State
and Territory governments on these matters’ (Andrews, 2001, pp. 228-9). The Recommendation seems
designed to leave public consultation and debate out of the process that generates advice to governments.
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2 A six-member Legislation Review Committee (LRC), chaired by John S. Lockhart, was established in
mid-2005 and submitted its report to COAG for its 19 December 2005 deadline; the report was also tabled
in both Houses of the Australian Parliament and will be debated in 2006 (Lockhart, 2005, p. 4).
